Essays on Infinite Lifespans   Russell Blackford 259 By way of explanation, consider the following counterexam- ple to P1: a close friend who loves me ceases to do so (for whatever reason). I might never be adversely affected by this, in the sense of suffering unpleasant sensations, e.g., my friend might maintain a pretense of love, and I might, as events turn out, never even become aware of the change in her feelings. Yet, the loss of a friend’s love is usually considered to be a misfortune. [3; pg. 4–6] An Epicurean could respond to such counterexamples by making suitable modifications to both premises of The Basic Epicurean Argument. Thus, the Epicurean might point out that, if a friend has ceased to love me, she might thereafter have some propensity to act in ways that I will find unpleas- ant.  The  Epicurean  could  modify  P1  by  including  among the classes of misfortunes those events that, at the time they happen, make us more vulnerable to unpleasant sensations. She could then plausibly modify P2 to state that death is not such an event – after all, I will have no unpleasant sensations, or sensations of any other kind, once I am dead. Since both premises  have  been  modified  appropriately,  the  argument remains valid. Not all possible counterexamples can be accommodated in this way. For example, will it not be a misfortune for me if my reputation is defamed in some way after I die (possibly as a consequence of my death, since I will no longer be able to defend myself). An Epicurean could respond to this kind of example with a second strategy. She might suggest that the new example is not a misfortune. Rather, someone who wor- ries about such things is in the grip of a kind of pride that is irrational because it is not conducive to living the happiest kind of life. This brings us to the nub of the matter. A full Epicurean argument  against  the  rationality  of  fearing  death  would have   to   include   a   specific   account   of   the   good   life.